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1 Introduction 
Many innovations come from ventures initiated by individual entrepreneurs and small 
firms, and many regions owe their economic dynamism to a large number of innovative 
ventures. The relative success that entrepreneurial ventures have had in commercialising 
discontinuous innovation has spurred an entire body of literature about the inability of 
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large firms to innovate (see Dougherty and Heller, 1994; Christensen, 1997; Leifer et al., 
2001). Yet, entrepreneurial ventures also fail very often, wasting the efforts and resources 
invested in them and endangering their owners’ financial health. While many failures are 
inevitable because of risks inherent in innovation, some of them could be prevented. This 
paper presents a dynamic model that enhances our understanding of the relation between 
risks and resource requirements in innovative ventures. The model is grounded, on the 
one hand, in the academic literature on business strategy and innovation, and, on the 
other hand, in 17 case studies of innovative ventures. This model enables us to provide 
recommendations for the development of business plans that could reduce the number of 
preventable failures.  
A key implication of the model is the importance of surprising events in the life of  
a venture. It is well known that successful ventures strike a dynamic balance between the 
evolving risks of their innovation project and the resources that they attract and deploy. 
But seeking this balance often leads to an emphasis on anticipatory planning, namely on 
analysing the market, technical and other aspects of the venture in order to predict future 
evolutions and secure the needed resources. Yet, the study of large-scale engineering 
projects and of the innovation projects of large companies suggests that unpredicted and 
often unpredictable events are likely to occur in any complex project (Floricel and Miller, 
2001; Verganti, 1999). The case studies carried out for this research suggest not only that 
surprising events happen in most innovative ventures but also that they are a major source 
of preventable failures. Reacting to such events requires significant inflows of new 
resources into the venture. However, inflows are usually prevented by the disconcerting 
effect that surprising events have on venture participants and by the centrifugal reactions 
they trigger among participants. Because most ventures have limited internal resources, 
barely sufficient for the anticipated activities and risks, the lack of new resource inflows 
leads to the demise of the venture, and the related loss of investment and accumulated 
knowledge.  
To avoid such situations, business plans must include measures that enable the 
innovative ventures to react to unexpected events and minimise their consequences. 
These measures include: trying to ‘provoke’ the occurrence of unexpected events as early 
as possible, before significant resources are committed to a given course of action; 
increasing the flexibility of the venture by staging the resources investment, and  
hence limiting that are committed, or sunk, into a particular trajectory; modularising  
the organisational and technical aspects of the venture in order to contain the effect of 
unexpected events to a limited portion of the project; developing proactively alternative 
paths, including other, shorter term and less risky projects, which can provide resources 
to the main project of the venture; and cultivating external links to which the venture can 
turn quickly in order to attract additional resources. 
These insights are developed throughout the paper. Hence, Section 2 provides  
a theoretical background on strategy and risks in innovative ventures, which distinguishes 
anticipated risks from unexpected events. After briefly discussing the methods used for 
analysing the case studies, Section 3 details the dynamic model that relates the activities, 
risks and resources of an innovative venture, and suggests why unexpected events often 
have significant negative consequences for the venture, especially as it approaches the 
commercialisation stage. A conclusion section presents detailed recommendations for the 
development of business plans. 
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2 Theoretical background 
Innovative activities are typically divided in four qualitatively distinct classes, or  
stages, (Hartmann and Myers, 2001). These build upon each other and, in real projects, 
are interlaced. The first category, technology research, includes the discovery and 
demonstration of operating principles, basic technical concepts and architectures.  
This sort of activities may be performed on a non-commercial basis, for instance in 
universities or public labs. They may precede the establishment of a venture and continue 
during the other stages. The second stage, definition, refers to searching for concrete 
customers, markets and product forms, as well as making fundamental decisions 
regarding the goals and form of the innovative venture. In the third stage, product 
development, activities include understanding customer needs and market dynamics and 
translating them into concrete technical specifications and marketing strategies, as well as 
designing, building and testing functional products and production processes. The fourth 
stage, commercialisation, refers to the production, marketing and distribution of new 
products. 
To sustain this stream of innovative activities, a venture depends on the continuing 
availability or inflow of many different resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), such as 
funds, knowledge, skilled personnel, organisational capabilities, specialised equipment, 
etc. Funds can be used to finance the acquisition or development of most other resources, 
hence while some resources are more difficult to obtain, the availability of funds, is  
a good proxy for the accessibility of all required inputs. Most resources, including 
financing, flow to a venture based on expectations about the chances it has to produce  
a good return for resource providers. The innovative activities that are performed in the 
later stages normally are usually deemed to require increasingly costly resource 
investments. Yet, it is also usually assumed that the progress of these activities  
also produces knowledge that reduces uncertainty, seen as the possible variance of  
the prospects that the venture has to create value (see for instance Scherer, 1999).  
If prospects remain good, lower uncertainty means lower risk, enabling higher amounts 
of resources to be invested in the venture. The decreasing uncertainty assumption justifies 
staged investment decision approaches (Cooper, 1995) as well as the practice of having 
multiple rounds of financing, which successively involve financial institutions with lower 
risk appetites. 
Studies of managerial risk perception in projects (March and Shapira, 1987; Shapira, 
1995) also suggest that, when anticipating the future, managers do not perceive 
uncertainty as exogenous and do not try to lump all aspects of the project into one single 
indicator of uncertainty. Instead, managers perform a multi-dimensional mapping of the 
risks affecting the projects and search for mitigating actions that can help them ‘manage’ 
these risks to improve the value creation prospects of the venture. This approach is 
similar to strategic planning based on the identification of strategic issues (Ansoff, 1980). 
In line with this multi-dimensional approach, practical methods for assessing the value 
creation potential of innovation projects often rely on ‘questionnaires’ or ‘scorecards’ 
that evaluate whether the project displays certain factors that are known to be associated 
to success or failure (e.g., Cooper, 1981; Hise and Groth, 1995). Some scorecards  
are specially designed for use in the early stages of entrepreneurial ventures, where 
eliminating poor prospects or correcting potential weaknesses will lead to significant 
resource savings (see for instance Udell, 1989). Others are built on the assumption that 
success factors are different in each stage of an innovative venture. For example, the 
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Bell-Mason Diagnostics (Bell and McNamara, 1991) scorecard and assesses a project on 
12 dimensions against a different ideal profile for each of four stages. Many authors also 
argue that the nature of success factors, risks, and mitigation measures varies with  
the specifics of the venture, such as the degree of technological and market novelty of the 
innovation (Hartmann and Myers, 2001; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000). Research suggests 
that such scorecards are quite reliable and produce better results than financial methods 
such as the net present value (Cooper et al., 1998; Astebro, 2002). 
But recent contributions on the dynamics of risk question the assumption of a steady 
decline in uncertainty as well as the emphasis on anticipatory planning. Research on 
complex projects hints that unexpected events raise significantly the level of uncertainty 
and risk in the late stages of the life cycle, calling for retaining strategic flexibility in 
these stages (Floricel and Miller, 2001; Verganti, 1999). Moreover, studies of radical or 
disruptive innovations show that development and commercialisation activities often 
show that current plans are not working, and this learning is followed by a corresponding 
increase of uncertainty and risk. Successful commercialisation of such innovations 
require several iterations that repeat all or some of the lifecycle stages until a viable way 
to produce value is discovered (Lynn et al., 1999; Leifer et al., 2000). Environmental 
turbulence, prevalent in certain sectors of the economy, increases the frequency and 
severity of unexpected events, which reduces the relevance of anticipatory mitigation and 
place responsive and iterative strategies at the forefront (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
MacCormack et al., 2001). 
Responding to unexpected events late in the life cycle of a project, or producing 
significant iterations, requires a large amount of additional resources. But in the 
diminishing uncertainty model the resource cooptation process is seen as a linear increase 
in resource investment that parallels, with more or less slack, the decrease in uncertainty. 
This approach to financing innovative ventures is not designed to address major and, 
especially, unexpected difficulties and increases in uncertainty. When such events arrive 
late in the project lifecycle, they are seen as the equivalent of a project failure and  
as a signal for terminating the venture in order to stop any further resource waste. Yet,  
the number of preventable failures of this type can be reduced by understanding the 
inevitable changes in the nature of the risk and their relation to the resource requirements 
of innovative ventures. The perceptual model of risk presented in the following section 
explicitly gives unexpected events a key place in the evolution of venture risks and links 
it to the temporal sequence of activities and to the evolution of resource requirements. 
3 A model of risk and resource evolution 
The model presented in this section builds upon the insights from the research literature 
on strategy, innovation, and project management, presented in the previous section.  
In particular, it extends Floricel and Miller’s (2001) model of strategic risk evolution in 
complex projects. The model is also grounded in 17 cases studies of innovative ventures. 
All ventures were established in the 1990s and were developing one core innovation 
project (see Table 1 for details on each case). Each case study is based on one or  
more individual semi-structured interviews with entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, bank 
employees and government officials involved with the venture. The interviews  
lasted about one hour and a half each, were recorded and subsequently transcribed.  
The resulting data were analysed using a semi-grounded (Corbin and Strauss, 1990) 
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model-building method. The content of the interviews was analysed qualitatively, in 
order to identify a large number of instances (or ‘exemplars’) of relevant phenomena 
such as perceptions of risks, resource cooptation, expected and unexpected events.  
A systematic comparison helped identify recurring themes, develop concepts and 
dimensions, and identify dynamic links of general relevance between these constructs. 
The resulting dynamic model of risk and resource evolution is shown in Figure 1 and 
detailed below. 
Table 1 Summary of case studies (firm name removed for confidentiality) 
Geographic area Main innovation project 
Venture still exists 
(end 2005) 
Montreal, Canada Diagnostic test for a specific disease No 
Montreal, Canada Biomarkers for specific class of diseases Yes 
Vienna, Austria Diagnostic biochip for a specific class of 
diseases 
Yes 
Montreal, Canada Production of active chemical compounds 
from plants 
No 
Toronto, Canada Pain and stress relief device No 
Ottawa, Canada Device for inspecting and cleaning optic fibres Yes 
North Carolina, USA Vaccine for HIV Yes 
Shawinigan, Canada Heating devices for industrial rolls Yes 
Trois-Rivières, Canada Radio tracking system for industrial processes Yes 
Montreal, Canada Feeder for a specific type of industrial 
equipment 
No 
Montreal, Canada Device helping deaf students learn in normal 
classes 
Yes 
Montreal, Canada Magnetic material for anti-theft devices Yes 
WestVirginia, USA Power plants using coal residue as a fuel No 
Quebec City, Canada Medical device steriliser Yes 
Montreal, Canada System for treating geospatial data  Yes 
Montreal, Canada System for geo-referenced land videography  Yes 
Montreal, Canada Glue-based wound closure product No 
3.1 Value creation perspectives and the evolution of risks 
Ambiguity. An innovative venture is a stream of actions effected by different participants 
connected by common value creation goals. Generally, risks are contingent upon actions 
that have not yet been undertaken (Luhmann, 1993). But risks are even higher if the 
intended actions, for instance the way the venture would create value, are not yet defined. 
Hence, in the initial stage of a venture, perceptions of risks are dominated by ambiguity 
regarding future actions, due to a lack of clarity regarding the nature of the innovation 
project, its intended markets, technology, product, etc. This lack of definition makes 
investment to appear risky and usually precludes resources flows to the project.  
For example, venture capitalists interviewed with regard to the biotechnology ventures in 
our sample pointed out to their reluctance to invest in firms that had only a technology 
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platform but no clear product or business model. Hence, initial activities concentrate on 
defining the parameters of the venture, for instance on delimiting the scope of the project 
and building a business case. The early business plan is the preferred way to codify  
and communicate these parameters. In the process, these activities establish a shared 
cognitive framework, which participants will use as a reference for further action.  
As details become clearer the risk due to ambiguity diminishes (discontinuous line at the 
left of Figure 1). 
Figure 1 The model of risk and resource lifecycle in innove ventures 
 
Anticipated uncertainty. Once the definition phase establishes a reference framework for 
the venture, risk perceptions shift their focus to the uncertainty affecting the success of 
the intended actions. Managers are not sure whether intended actions, such as using  
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a given technical solution and targeting a certain market segment, will enable them to 
achieve an adequate value creation level. In this case, risks stem from the possibility that 
some aspects of the future reality will turn out unfavourable for the project, although they 
may also turn out more favourable than expected. Managers can not predict perfectly  
the outcomes of relevant technical, market, and other processes because they have only 
imperfect knowledge about them. In addition, the success may be contingent on actions 
outside the control of the venture, such as customer response in the targeted segment or 
the adoption of a regulation that legitimates the given technical solution. This risk related 
to uncertainties within the cognitive framework is the one usually considered in the 
planning literature. Because of its ‘evident’ nature it is represented by a continuous line 
in the risk graph of Figure 1. 
As Scherer (1999) points out, uncertainty is highest in the initial development stage 
when, even if a reference framework is defined, little market research, concept testing, 
design or prototyping has been performed. Knowledge production activities, such as 
technical and market feasibility, gradually reduce uncertainty with respect to envisioned 
actions. Hence, activities that reduce technical uncertainty may involve, successively,  
a literature review, analytical modeling, physical prototyping etc., they produce 
knowledge that enables an ever closer approximation of the behaviour of the final 
innovative product (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000). Market uncertainty is reduced through 
market research, simulated market tests, and limited product launches, etc., which give  
a progressively closer picture of the final customer response in the target segment. 
Theorists and the interviewed practitioners agree that uncertainty increases overall 
with the degree of project novelty and the lack of relevant experience in the firm. Hence, 
from a technical viewpoint, a project is more risky if it is a radical innovation rather  
than a marginal improvement of an existing technology (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991).  
The market potential is more uncertain, and risky, if the venture has to create a new 
market as opposed to selling into an existing market, particularly one in which the  
firm is already present with other products (Hartman and Myers, 2001). In market 
creation situations, ventures have to generate consumer awareness for a new class of 
products, change consumption and purchasing behaviours, build distribution, etc. All this 
additional effort is spent with little knowledge about the relation between effort and 
success. 
But case studies confirm that entrepreneurs, their financial backers and other 
stakeholders, use knowledge production to map and address separate risks rather than to 
assess uncertainty overall. Within the cognitive framework of the venture, they focus on 
situations that can create obstacles in achieving the value creation goals, put additional 
pressure on resources, or reduce the control of the venture over relevant processes. Once 
these elements identified, participants seek active mitigating measures that reduce the 
likelihood or the impact of these elements. For example, a product that triggers a complex 
purchasing process in the client’s organisation, requiring the approval of multiple 
stakeholders, departments and organisational levels, will lengthen and complicate  
the sales process and will require additional human and financial resources. In one of  
the studied cases, this even bankrupted the venture, because it did not have the cash flow 
needed to survive during the long time period before orders were placed. To mitigate this 
risk, other ventures leased their products or priced them under the thresholds that trigger 
lengthy approval processes. Other examples of anticipated risks are shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2 Examples of anticipated risks in ventures 
Venture aspect Risky situation 
The design or the production of the innovation relies on technologies or parts 
that are not currently mastered by the venture 
The project has a level of complexity for which the venture does not have the 
required experience or competencies 
The manufacturing of the product requires a novel high-volume dedicated 
process 
The operation of the product is conditioned by the adoption of a technical 
standard 
The operation of the product is conditioned by the development and 
provision of complementary products 
Technical 
The performance of the product is conditioned by its compatibility with 
existing the existing technical infrastructure and practices 
Only one or a few large firms are potential customers and they can impose 
conditions on a small venture 
The product will be sold in a fragmented market in which customer needs are 
not homogeneous and no distribution partner has a sizable part of potential 
customers 
A large competitor is present or intends to enter the market, especially one 
that can influence distribution channels or offer more complete product 
family  
Market 
The product will be sold in a market prone to price and promotion wars, 
reducing the window of opportunity for the venture to consolidate itself in 
the market 
Commercialisation is conditioned by a regulatory approval or certification 
for the product or its manufacturing process 
Other 
There is possibility of social or political resistance with respect to the 
product, the underlying technology, or their social and environmental impact 
Knowledge production and other development activities as well as risk mapping and 
mitigation activities reduce uncertainty and clarify the value creation prospects; often, 
they also increase the chances of success. This process naturally leads, within the 
reference framework of the venture, to situations that are difficult and require additional 
resources. For example, in of the examined cases, a substance that was used initially to 
glue wounds proved to be chemically unstable. The venture had to hire an expert  
in chemistry to develop a replacement solution. In the end, the technical solution  
he developed, which involved two components rather than one, was not only adequate 
but had additional benefits compared to the solution considered initially. However, in 
other cases the process uncovers adverse circumstances that become ‘showstoppers’ 
(Leifer et al., 2000); such situations clearly prove that the value creation perspectives of 
the venture very poor and, as a consequence, the flow of innovative action stops. 
Unexpected events. But many ventures also encounter problems that stem from 
events that are totally unexpected, that fall outside the initial reference framework.  
While uncertainty with respect to the elements envisioned initially diminishes, these 
‘discoveries’ shift the reference framework; new or previously unanticipated elements 
enter the picture and, in many cases, considerably increase the uncertainty and the risk. 
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Luhmann (1993, p.43) depicts the perception of a discontinuous shift in the reference 
framework in the following way:  
“When we look back, we no longer understand why in a present now belonging 
to the past we had been so cautious or, as the case may be, why we had made 
such a risky decision. And from out of the future another present stares us in 
the face, in which we will in retrospect certainly come to a different appraisal 
of the risk situation we are experiencing in the present.” 
The case studies show that unexpected events, especially those that cause significant 
shifts in the reference framework, usually occur later in the project life cycle, when the 
stream of action is no longer consists just of planning and analysing but starts confronting 
the concrete physical and socioeconomic reality. Surprises are common in innovation 
projects when full-scale prototypes are built, when market tests and commercialisation 
begins, or when the products undergo regulatory approval procedures. Because most 
activities focus on reducing the expected uncertainties and are oblivious to the almost 
certain onset of unexpected events, the risk from these surprising events is represented  
by the dotted line shown at the right of Figure 1. 
Some unexpected events occur because ventures lack the required resources and  
time to perform extensive development activities or simply because these activities  
are inadequate. For example, in one of the case studies a venture discovered, when 
approaching commercialisation with the device it produced, not only that tens of similar 
devices, much cheaper even if inferior, were available on the market, but also that whole 
idea behind the operating principle of the device, had been discredited since the 1980s, 
because these crude devices had proven ineffective. In another case, using the diagnostic 
product of the venture required a minor chirurgical intervention. Despite its usefulness, 
almost no customer agreed to undergo the procedure merely for diagnostic purposes. 
Both ventures were unsuccessful, for reasons could have detected earlier and hence, 
could have avoided the waste of resources. 
But, in most cases, surprises stem from the genuine complexity of the real world, 
from uncontrollable circumstances and behaviors of independent actors, and from  
the limitations of the anticipatory analytical approaches and models that ventures can 
realistically use. For instance, during our study a newly elected government decided to 
cut government support in the form of venture capital funds for biotech firms. This led  
to a wave of bankruptcies and consolidations, including the bankruptcy of one of the 
ventures in our sample. In another case, the value creation perspective of venture that was 
developing a power plant using residual coals were quashed by an unexpected reduction 
in the price of normal coal, to which the payments that the plant would receive were tied 
contractually. None of the project participants expected that, after decades of continuous 
growth, coal prices would suddenly fall; they only expected, and factored in the 
estimation models, various percentages of price increase. 
The more turbulent are the technical, market and regulatory environments the more 
likely it is that ventures will encounter surprises (Emery and Trist, 1965; Bettis and Hitt, 
1995). Turbulence in the technical environment means constant and unexpected change 
and novelties in technologies, infrastructures, tools, materials and components. Such 
events enable competitors to offer a superior product or affect components and materials 
currently used, calling for a redesign of the product. While firms in more stable sectors 
saw little relevant change, the ventures we studied in the biotech sector witnessed many 
competing technological discoveries, competitors that proposed alternatives to serve the 
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same need or even entire paradigm shifts during the life cycle or their projects. Market 
turbulence occurs in the form constantly changing user needs, competitors that introduce 
frequently new products, and a constant flow of new entrants. In the end, firms in 
turbulent environments incorporate the expectation of surprising developments into their 
reference frameworks and organise their activities accordingly (Bogner and Barr, 2000). 
3.2 Resource cooptation 
Normal linear cooptation. As mentioned above, ventures need different resources in order 
to advance their innovative activities. The literature and the case studies show that 
resources flow to a venture based on three main considerations. The first one, the value 
creation potential of the venture after factoring in the various risks it faces, results from  
a combination of market, technical and other aspects. This aspect and the related risks 
have already been discussed above. The second consideration is the ability of the venture 
to find a protected niche that enables it to capture most of the value it creates (Alvarez 
and Barney, 2005). The third consideration refers to the key human resources of the 
venture, namely the abilities of its owner-entrepreneur and top executives. The last two 
considerations will be discussed in more detail below. 
Interviewees among resource providers were interested in the presence of barriers that 
enable the venture to capture the value it creates, as suggested by an almost obsessive 
attention to intellectual property protection issues, by the discussions of issues such as the 
nature of market competition, the creation of an organisational memory and of successors 
that can take over in case key experts leave the company or are no longer able to work 
etc. This concern is echoed by strategy research, which suggests that, in competitive 
environments firm performance is related to favourable asymmetries in market access or 
internal capabilities (Porter, 1980; Wernefelt, 1984), which preclude entry, attack or 
imitation by competitors. Such ‘appropriability regimes’ (Teece, 1986) or ‘isolating 
mechanisms’ (McGee and Thomas, 1986) that enable innovators value capture result 
from institutional frameworks (Cohen, 2005; Stigler, 1971), economies of scale and 
scope in innovation, production and distribution (Scherer, 1990), network and reputation 
effects (Shapiro and Varian, 1999) or the nature of knowledge and resources  
(Barney, 1991). 
Besides the potential and protection of a venture, resource providers also emphasise 
the human potential of its owners and top executives. The literature (Harris and Jackson, 
1999; Heunks, 1998; Karlsson and Olsson, 1998) and our case studies suggest that  
the abilities of the entrepreneurs and the management teams play a significant role in the 
success of a venture. Resource providers mentioned that they appreciate the ability of  
an entrepreneur to understand the real resource requirements of a venture, to develop an 
inspiring long-term vision and explain it in simple terms to resource providers, to develop 
a network of contacts among these providers. Personality traits, such as the willingness to 
share control, were also evaluated. Experience is also important, as demonstrated by the 
existence of many successful ‘serial entrepreneurs’. In many ventures that were studied, 
when these abilities were not present, resource providers forced the entrepreneurs to 
accept on the management team executives with a different background and in some 
cases even replaced the entrepreneur with professional managers. The importance of top 
executives is underscored by the fact that many interviewees among resource providers 
showed a preference for financing “an average project proposed by an excellent team, 
rather than an excellent project proposed by a weak team”. But these human aspects may 
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be overemphasised because resource providers may be more confident in their own 
ability to evaluate a person that in their ability to evaluate the potential of a venture.  
As will be discussed below this over-reliance on personal trust may be worsening the 
ability of a venture to react to unexpected events. 
The expectations regarding the value creation opportunity together with the barriers 
that enable the value capture create a niche that protects the venture. This niche and the 
resource providers are like a ‘social elevator’ (Sorokin, 1959) that helps the innovator 
transform an innovative idea into an established company. The mix of participants 
changes frequently, as actors join the venture to bring complementary knowledge  
and resources. Some participants are invited to join merely because credibility of the 
opportunity increases with the number and reputation of actors who support it (Podolny 
and Stuart, 1996). Early resource providers, such as venture capitalists, are keenly 
interested, from the moment they join the niche, in having a clear exit strategy. By selling 
their interest to other investors, large firms, or on the public financial markets, they hope 
to obtain a return on investment well before the venture enters the commercialisation 
phase. Niches last only as long as the expectations about the evolving opportunity for 
value creation and capture are positive; when this is no longer the case resource providers 
reorient their investment. 
Ventures grow by repeatedly leveraging the results of uncertainty-reducing 
innovation activities in order to renew resources. Most early funds providers are strategic 
investors or venture capitalists. Entrepreneurs use their ideas to build a rough ‘vision of 
the future’ and act to persuade resource providers to give their venture seed money. Then, 
funds are used for activities that produce knowledge that reduces the risk of their 
projects. Results from these activities are, in turn, used as a springboard to negotiate 
another round of financing, which has lower cost. In turn, these funds are used to create  
a functional prototype. This prototype and other results are leveraged to obtain financing 
for commercialisation, including sometimes through an initial offering in public financial 
markets. This process continues until the venture becomes self-sustaining and can finance 
further activities with the proceeds from the sale of its products. The almost linear 
process of resource cooptation, which echoes the almost linear reduction in uncertainty, is 
depicted by the solid line in the lower part of Figure 1.  
Cooptation after turbulent events. The linear mode of growth gives ventures a moving 
a ‘resource horizon’, with a limited temporal depth. Most small innovative firms have to 
live with a precarious situation in terms of resources (Julien et al., 1996). An interviewee 
argued that it is almost useless to think beyond the next six months (or the time afforded 
by current financing round). In other words, ventures have a rolling span of attention  
that includes only the nearest set of activities, for which it has resources. Resource 
bottlenecks occur even for anticipated activities, especially when the venture approaches 
transitions between financing rounds, as financing rounds did not correspond neatly to 
the stages of the innovative activities. Funds dry up, for instance, before the venture 
could finalise its development activities. Concerns about obtaining the next financing 
round put a constant pressure on entrepreneurs and managers. Executives, who are also 
sometimes the key technical experts of the venture, spend significant efforts for obtaining 
the needed resources. 
But these difficulties increase significantly when the venture encounters unexpected 
events that shift its frame of reference in the later stages of its project. The fact that 
surprises usually occur late in the lifecycle of the project makes them even more difficult 
to tackle, because the entire resource configuration of the venture is oriented towards 
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activities anticipated within the initial framework. Earlier technical choices, market 
strategies and partnership agreements irreversibly commit or sink resources in directions 
that are no longer feasible, and reduce the flexibility that managers have in responding to 
surprises. Reorienting the project requires significant additional financial and human 
resources, which puts an important strain on already precarious small firms. Only an easy 
access to additional external resources enables ventures to perform the almost complete 
iteration required to save the innovation project. Yet, even if the project has good value 
creation perspectives in the new situation, these perspectives are very uncertain and 
require additional validation. Thus, ventures may be refused access to these additional 
resources. 
In addition to the renewed uncertainty and risk perceptions, the impact of exogenous 
unexpected events on innovative ventures is amplified by non-linear endogenous 
processes that affect the participants and the relations between them. The normal startling 
effect of unexpected events may paralyse participants’ capacity for creative response.  
In addition, some participants may experience well-known shift ‘between hope and fear’ 
(Lopes, 1987) documented by the behavioural studies of risk. Namely, according to the 
two-reference point theory of risk taking (March and Shapira, 1992; Shapira, 1995) 
participants’ reference for judging their situation may shift from an ‘aspiration level’,  
a benchmark for setting expectations that varies function of the already achieved 
performance and accumulated resources, to a ‘survival level’, a dreaded, rock bottom 
point where all resources are exhausted. The fact that resource providers all over sudden 
envision such an exhaustion point may explain why they cut their support for the venture 
very swiftly in some of the cases we studied. 
The fact that managerial preparedness and trustworthiness is used by resource 
providers as a dominant evaluation point for the venture (Knight, 1994; Zopounidis, 
1994) also increases the non-linear effect of unexpected events. The personal trust, which 
compensated for the inability to judge the intrinsic value creation outlook of the venture, 
disappears as a result of surprises. In some cases of ventures, following unexpected 
events, entrepreneurs that used to be the darlings of venture capitalists became pariahs. 
Without the halo effect of their personalities the perspectives of the project probably 
appear much bleaker to resource providers than they really were following the 
unexpected event. Even if resources are not cut immediately, the openness and 
cooperation that could help participants find a creative solution for the new situation 
disappears. After the unexpected price hike that affected their value creation perspectives, 
participants in the venture that was building an innovative power plant using residual 
coal, started hiding their activities from the representatives of other participating firms 
and began exchanging formal documents in order to position themselves for a possible 
arbitration. 
Given the ubiquity of unexpected events, the main argument of this paper is that  
a much higher number of innovative ventures than previously thought fail not because  
of a normal attrition due to the inherent risk of innovation, not because of the normal 
difficulties in securing resources, not even because of the fact that the venture undergoes 
the reality test for the first time in its lifecycle, but because of the inability to marshal 
resources that would enable the venture to overcome the effects of unexpected events. 
This type of failure is particularly painful because it arrives rather late in the lifecycle, 
when a lot of resources are already invested and ventures have developed organisational 
processes and competencies. In the case of the venture specialising in the production of 
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active chemical compounds from plants, failure arrived when it had just invested in a new 
building with state of the art production facilities.  
In sum, many of the ventures that fail because of unexpected events could be, in fact, 
saved with an inflow of additional resources and may go on to create significant value for 
the resource providers and the society. Saving them usually requires a significant increase 
in resource cooptation, which, in proportion, corresponds to the dotted line in the lower 
part of Figure 1. But entrepreneurs and the ventures they own are not prepared to face 
this reverse tidal wave that affects other participants’ attitudes, following an unexpected 
event, and the ensuing resource drought. Below we will discuss some of the measures 
that can be taken beforehand in order to reduce the need for additional resources and to 
increase the survival chances of these ventures. 
4 Conclusions and implications for business plans 
This paper shows the processes whereby the unexpected events can cause problems for 
innovative ventures and suggests that these processes make unexpected events a major 
cause of preventable failure for this type of ventures. These conclusions are based on 
qualitative research, which is particularly suitable for theorising complex processes. 
However, certain conclusions such as the relative incidence of turbulent events and 
preventable failures caused by them would benefit from additional validation, based on 
research using quantitative methods and relying on a larger sample of ventures. If the 
suggested conclusions receive additional confirmation, further research should focus on 
ways to reduce the preventable failures. Some of root causes why ventures are unable to 
overcome unexpected events could be institutional, originating in the organisation  
of the financial system and the prevailing venture evaluation methods, which are, as  
we mentioned, based on a linear model of diminishing uncertainty. But venture managers 
can also takes steps towards reducing the effect of unexpected events. The remainder of 
this section suggests elements that could be included in business plans in order to 
increase the capacity of the venture to respond to unexpected events. 
It is difficult to know what can be done to prepare for unexpected events when, by 
definition, these events are unknown in advance to managers. One of the possible 
avenues is to ‘provoke’ the occurrence of unexpected events as early as possible, before 
significant resources are committed to a given course of action. As mentioned above, 
many unexpected events occur when the project confronts the physical and social reality. 
Thus, business plans could emphasise early tests of real prototypes and involving  
real clients as a way of provoking unexpected events. Research on ventures working  
in turbulent environments, such as internet startups, shows that they repeatedly use 
imperfect ‘probe’ products in order to get rapid client feedback. Some of them, such as 
Netscape, used as many as seven iterations involving successive ‘Beta’ prototypes in 
their innovation projects. Those who prepare the business plan must weigh the additional 
complexity and the reduced control over development, as well as the potential loss  
of reputation with clients against the benefit of having an early warning system for 
unexpected events. 
Another possibility is to retain as much flexibility as possible by developing  
a business plan that prioritise or stage the resource investment in a way that limits the 
amount of resources that are committed, or sunk, into a particular development trajectory. 
Hence, rather than addressing all aspects of a venture head on, projected development 
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activities could first address key issues and, only if results turn out favourable for the 
venture, invest in developing the rest of the project. Ventures could also use, as much  
as possible, flexible technical solutions, manufacturing process and alliances. For 
example, a strategy of using in products, whenever possible, generic and reprogrammable 
electronic components rather than rigid special purpose components, or even software 
rather hardware, could both delay costly investment in developing the components and 
give designers the option to reprogram them later. The human equivalent is relying on 
generalists rather than narrow specialists. Those who prepare the business plan must 
weigh the potential increase in cost or loss of performance against the benefit of 
increased flexibility. 
Business plans could also include the proactive development of alternative paths.  
To increase their ability to secure additional funding or simply in order to survive, many 
of the biotech ventures that were studied pursued, in response to unexpected events, 
alternative projects that had shorter a term and were less risky. These projects could 
quickly generate revenues and provide resources to the main project of the venture.  
For some ventures, this approach had the positive consequence of enriching them with  
a vision for growth based on multiple technologies, products and markets. In many cases, 
rather than responding to unexpected events, such projects could be planned and even 
started in advance, by relying on the interests and creativity of R&D personnel. In this 
case, those who prepare the business plan must weigh the potential loss of focus for the 
venture against the increase in the number of trajectories for further development. 
Another possibility is to emphasise organisational and technical modularity in order 
to contain the effect of unexpected events to a limited portion of the venture. Modularity 
means limiting the interactions between different subsystems of a project or organisation. 
To do so, business plans should emphasise proactive investment in the architectural 
design of products and organisations. For example, resources could be dedicated to the 
early definition the functionality of the different subsystems and of the interfaces between 
them. Those who prepare the business plan must weigh the additional cost and the loss  
of efficiency that may result from the use of modular structures against the increased 
responsiveness and flexibility that such structures provide. 
Finally, the business plan could become a promotional tool for cultivating external 
links to which the venture can turn quickly in order to attract additional resources. In the 
final stages, when unexpected usually events occur, business plans must promote the base 
of accumulated knowledge and the other results that the venture has obtained, and show 
how these could be leveraged in case of unexpected developments that will change 
radically the nature of the venture. Business plans should also include alternative actions 
paths prepared for such eventualities and show how the providers of additional resources 
could minimise their exposure in case such events occur. Those who prepare the business 
plan should weigh the possible loss of confidence from current resource providers against 
the benefit of a faster resource access. 
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper contributes to the theory of 
innovative venturing by providing a better understanding of the sources of avoidable 
failure for ventures. After further research and careful validation, the theoretical and 
practical insights could improve business plans and, hence, ease the access of innovative 
ventures to resources, as well as provide guidance to entrepreneurs and their advisors.  
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